



Government
of South Australia

The Hon Clare Scriven MLC

Our ref: eA197922 IR
Obj ID: A5681501
Your ref: 16369328

Hon Nicola Centofanti MLC
Member of the Legislative Council
Parliament House
ADELAIDE SA 5000

Dear Ms Centofanti

Internal Review Determination under the *Freedom of Information Act 1991*

I refer to your application for Internal Review made under the *Freedom of Information Act 1991* received on 8 November 2022.

Your original application sought access to the following:

“A copy of all correspondence to and from the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development (including directly with staff within the office of the Minister for Primary Industries), relating to lumpy skin disease.”

Timeframe: 19/03/2022 to 19/08/2022

Pursuant to Section 14A of the Freedom of Information Act, an extension to the legislative timeframe in which to provide a determination was extended until 11 October 2022.

It is noted that you have proceeded to Internal Review as the Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development, Minister for Forest Industries failed to determine your original application within the legislative timeframe, and therefore deemed a refusal of access.

Internal review of the documents

Following an independent internal review of your application, I advise the following:

Issues in this review

The Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development, Office of the Minister for Forest Industries did not provide a determination within the legislative timeframe, pursuant to Section 14A of the Freedom of Information Act.

Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Minister for Forest Industries

GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001
Telephone 08 8226 2931 | Email minister.scriven@sa.gov.au



Consideration

Your application was being processed and was near finalisation.

The Office of the Minister is currently dealing with a large volume of applications, and apologises that your original application was not determined within the legislative timeframe.

Internal Review Determination

The following determination has been finalised.

I have located six documents that are captured within the scope of your request.

Determination 1

I have determined that access to the following documents is **granted in full**:

Doc No.	Description of document	No. of Pages
2	Minute from Chief Executive, Department of Primary Industries and Regions to Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development dated 15 July 2022 re Agriculture Ministers Meeting and Lumpy Skin Disease	4
3	Email from the office of the Hon Clare Scriven MLC to the office of Senator the Hon Murray Watt dated 4 August 2022, containing a letter re Lumpy Skin Disease	2
4	Minute from Chief Executive, Department of Primary Industries and Regions to Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development dated 3 June 2022 re Update on Lumpy Skin Disease and Foot and Mouth Disease	4
4a	Lumpy Skin Disease fact sheet (attachment A of Document 4)	2

Attachment B of Document 4 is outside of the scope of your application and is therefore not attached.

Determination 2

I have determined that access to the following document is **granted in part**:

Doc No.	Description of document	No. of Pages
1	Email from the office of Senator the Hon Murray Watt to the office of the Hon Clare Scriven MLC dated 4 July 2022, containing a letter and attachment re Lumpy Skin Disease	5

The information removed from the above document is pursuant to Clause 6(1) of Schedule 1 of the Freedom of Information Act which states:

“6 - Documents affecting personal affairs

(1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of any person (living or dead).”

The information removed consists of the name and mobile telephone number of a non-SES Departmental employee. Pursuant to Section 25 of the Freedom of Information Act, consultation was undertaken with the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and consent was not provided to release these details.

Accordingly, it is considered that disclosure of this information would be an unreasonable intrusion into the privacy rights of the individual concerned.

Determination 3

I have determined that access to the following document is **refused**:

Doc No.	Description of document	No. of Pages
4c	Attachment C of Document 4 - Draft National Lumpy Skin Disease Action Plan	45

Access to the above document is refused pursuant to Clause 5(1)(a)(i) and Clause 9(1) of Schedule 1 of the Freedom of Information Act.

The document consists of a draft national plan circulated for consultation between the Commonwealth, state and territory governments and industry organisations.

Clause 5(1)(a)(i) states:

“5—Documents affecting inter-governmental or local government relations

(1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter—

(a) the disclosure of which -

(i) could reasonably be expected to cause damage to intergovernmental relations; and

(b) the disclosure of which would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.”

In addressing the public interest test for the Clause 5 exemption, I have balanced the following factors:

In favour of the public interest:

- Meeting the objects of the Act favouring access to documents.
- Ensuring optimal use of public resources.
- High level of interest in the accountability of public office holders.

- The importance of transparency and openness and the interest that the public has in the decision-making processes of Government.
- High level of community and media interest in biosecurity risks in Australia.

Contrary to the public interest:

- The need to preserve confidentiality of information being shared between government agencies in the development of a national plan that has not yet been released.
- The recent age of the information was considered and the continuing relevance of the matters.
- To release this information prematurely would undermine the government's efforts in addressing the biosecurity risk and harm inter-governmental relationships with the Commonwealth, state and territory governments resulting in those agencies reconsidering their position regarding their future interactions with the SA Government.

Clause 9(1) states:

“9—Internal working documents

(1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter—

(a) that relates to -

(i) any opinion, advice or recommendation that has been obtained, prepared or recorded; or

(ii) any consultation or deliberation that has taken place, in the course of, or for the purpose of, the decision-making functions of the Government, a Minister or an agency; and

(b) the disclosure of which would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.”

In addressing the public interest test for the Clause 9 exemption, I have balanced the following factors:

In favour of the public interest:

- Meeting the objects of the Act favouring access to documents.
- Ensuring optimal use of public resources.
- High level of interest in the accountability of public office holders.
- The importance of transparency and openness and the interest that the public has in the decision-making processes of Government.
- High level of community and media interest in biosecurity risks in Australia.

Contrary to the public interest:

- Confidentiality at this stage of the development of the plan must be maintained for internal decision-making purposes.
- The recent age of the information was considered and the continuing relevance of the matters.

- To release this information prematurely would negatively impact the government's efforts in addressing the biosecurity risk.
- Disclosure of this information may compromise the manner in which information is circulated and gathered for the decision-making processes of Government. If such consultation was not able to be undertaken in the format of a draft document, this would jeopardise the way in which the Government seeks input for decision-making purposes.

Having considered the various factors weighing for and against disclosure for the Clause 5 and Clause 9 exemptions, I have determined that disclosure of this document would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.

If you are unhappy with this determination you are entitled to exercise your rights of external review with the Ombudsman SA. Alternatively, you can apply to the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). If you wish to seek a review, you must do so within 30 calendar days of receiving this internal review determination.

For more information about seeking a review or appeal, please contact the Ombudsman SA on telephone (08) 8226 8699 or SACAT on 1800 723 767.

In accordance with the requirements of Premier and Cabinet Circular PC045, details of your application, and the document to which you are given access, will be published in the disclosure log on the [PIRSA website](#). A copy of PC045 can be found at http://dpc.sa.gov.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0019/20818/PC045-Disclosure-Log-Policy.pdf.

If you disagree with publication, please advise the undersigned in writing within fourteen calendar days from the date of this determination.

Should you require further information or clarification with respect to this matter, please contact Ms Cindy Roberts on 8226 2931 or email: Minister.Scriven@sa.gov.au.

Yours sincerely



Hon Clare Scriven MLC
MINISTER FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRIES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MINISTER FOR FOREST INDUSTRIES

18 / 11 / 2022

eA197578

Smart, Sharon (PIRSA)

From: DLO Watt - Agriculture <dlo.watt@awe.gov.au>
Sent: Monday, 4 July 2022 2:37 PM
To: PIRSA:Minister Scriven
Cc: DLO Watt - Agriculture
Subject: Letter from Minister Watt [SEC=OFFICIAL]
Attachments: MS22-000789 - Minsiter Watt to SA.pdf; Letter ATT A-lumpy skin disease.docx

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Dear the Hon Clare Scriven MLC,

Please find attached a letter from Minister Watt for your consideration.

No hard copies to follow.

Kind regards,

Clause 6(1)

Departmental Liaison Officer | Office of Senator the Hon Murray Watt
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

M: **Clause 6(1)** E: DLO.Watt@Agriculture.gov.au

Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment

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SENATOR THE HON MURRAY WATT
MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY
MINISTER FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

MS22-000789

The Hon Clare Scriven MLC
Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Minister for Forest Industries
Parliament House
North Terrace
ADELAIDE SA 5000

Via email: Minister.Scriven@sa.gov.au

Dear Minister

With the election of the Albanese Government, I am honoured to now serve as the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. I am excited to have started work, including meeting with industry and other stakeholders during recent visits within Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia. I have also received briefings from my department, including on the areas of cooperation and collaboration between the Commonwealth and the States.

I value the contribution the industry makes to Australia, and it is exceptional to see that the value of Australia's agricultural exports is forecast to be the highest on record at \$64.9 billion in 2022–23, while the value of agricultural production is forecast to be \$80.4 billion, the second highest on record. Australian farm businesses have shown their reliability and resilience in the face of the pandemic, and I look forward to helping the industry—and the rural and regional communities that rely on a strong agriculture sector—to continue to grow and prosper.

The former minister for Agriculture, the Hon David Littleproud MP, convened the last Agriculture Ministers' Meeting (AMM) in November 2021. Much has changed since then and I would like to formally invite you to a meeting with our colleagues in the week commencing 18 July 2022. Given the timing is tight to make arrangements for us to meet, I propose a virtual meeting of up to two hours. The purpose is for me to get to know you, and as a group we can discuss our priorities for working together. I intend to follow up with a face-to-face meeting later in the year, though I expect we will be in touch via phone and email between formal meetings as needed.

My department advises me most AMM members wrote to my predecessor earlier this year supporting the AMM and identifying key priorities for the group. Some of these are consistent with what I have already been hearing, for example, biosecurity challenges, agricultural workforce issues and climate change. These issues are important to me and align with some of my priorities for the agriculture industry.

On the issue of biosecurity, one immediate threat to Australia's livestock industries is lumpy skin disease (LSD), a disease of cattle recently detected in Indonesia. A critical gap in our preparedness for LSD is access to the live virus at our high security laboratory facilities at CSIRO's Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (the Centre). The importation of live LSD virus to Australia would allow for testing vaccines, creating newer, safer LSD vaccines and new diagnostic capabilities. This would better prepare our national animal health system against any possible incursion of the disease. It is critical that we take immediate, concerted, and collaborative preparedness actions to protect Australia's livestock.

My department is currently undertaking a risk assessment for the importation of LSD virus to the Centre. The decision on the import of live LSD virus is made by the Director of Biosecurity (or delegate). The importation will not be permitted unless the biosecurity risks can be managed to meet Australia's Appropriate Level of Protection. To provide an additional level of assurance, the Inspector General of Biosecurity will review the proposed import process and compliance controls before any decision is made. Should import be permitted, live LSD virus will never leave the Centre. The Centre has a long history of safely importing and holding very serious exotic and zoonotic disease agents. Import of the virus does not change Australia's disease-free status. Relevant industry groups and state and territory government agriculture departments, including Chief Veterinary Officers were consulted on the potential importation of live LSD virus. In light of the recent incursion of LSD in Indonesia, all groups indicated they support the importation, subject to the risks being managed, and on the grounds, it was necessary to better prepare for a possible disease outbreak in Australia.


Further information about LSD and importing live virus into Australia is provided at [Attachment A](#).

I see opportunities for us to work collaboratively on not only the immediate biosecurity challenges we face, but also the other issues identified above, and inevitably others as they emerge. By working together, we can make sure the agriculture, fisheries and forestry sectors seize the opportunities available to it.

Further details and an agenda for the meeting will be provided shortly, however, should you require any further information regarding the meeting, please contact the AMM secretariat at amm-agsoc@agriculture.gov.au.

I look forward to working together through strong collaboration and dialogue to achieve the best possible outcomes for our rural and regional communities, and for the country.

Yours sincerely



MURRAY WATT

04 / 07 / 2022

Enc

Lumpy skin disease

Lumpy skin disease (LSD) is a highly infectious disease of cattle and water buffalo that does not affect other livestock or humans. The disease is caused by a virus like sheep pox and goat pox and is mostly transmitted by biting insects.

The global distribution of LSD is changing. Since 2019 the disease has spread through China and Southeast Asia, and in 2021 the disease was confirmed in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia. In March 2022 it was officially reported by Indonesia on the island of Sumatra.

If LSD were to occur in Australia, this would cause significant production costs to beef, water buffalo, and dairy cattle industries. In addition, there could be substantial effects on trade if Australia was no longer recognised as being free from LSD. The cost of an LSD incursion would also see severe economic losses to Australia's meat processing sector. Eradication of the disease would also be costly and difficult.

There is currently no LSD vaccine approved for use in Australia. In southern Europe vaccination has been used to effectively control LSD outbreaks. However, in other areas vaccination has not been successful.

Why Australia needs to import live lumpy skin disease virus

Importing LSD virus will facilitate Australia's access to safe and effective vaccines against the disease, if required. Access to the live virus will also enable Australia's top scientists to undertake research on LSD virus, which could lead to better vaccines for Australia and the region. Importing live LSD virus will also help improve Australia's diagnostic capacity.

Vaccines

All currently available commercial vaccines contain modified live LSD virus. Allowing import of the live virus will ensure Australia can test the quality and safety of internationally available LSD vaccines and then use a safe vaccine if there is an outbreak either domestically or in our near neighbours.

Diagnostics

Importing live LSD virus will improve Australia's diagnostic capacity. It will allow CSIRO, Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) to develop and validate new and improved tests for LSD. ACDP will also establish proficiency testing programs, to ensure state and territory government veterinary laboratories have LSD diagnostic capacity. Any diagnostic material that leaves ACDP will never contain live LSD virus. This means Australia's laboratory testing system will be well prepared if there is an outbreak.

Ability to test samples from our near neighbours

Our near neighbours such as Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea have limited diagnostic capacity and rely on Australia to provide laboratory support in the event of a disease outbreak. This support has previously been provided for African swine fever. In the event of an outbreak of LSD in our near neighbours, it would be vital that Australia could import live virus to provide diagnostic support to assist with the outbreak response and limit the spread of the disease. Helping to control disease in our near neighbours is vital for Australia's efforts to keep LSD virus from Australia.

The process for importing the live virus

- A comprehensive risk assessment of the LSD virus is being undertaken by the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment. The assessment will determine if there are risk management measures available to safely import the virus.
- The department will conduct a specific risk assessment of the facility at ACDP.
- The department will consult with states and territories through the Animal Health Committee (AHC) as well as environmental experts within the department.
- If it is determined that effective biosecurity risk management is possible an import permit application can be assessed.
- An import permit application involves the assessment of a range of factors including the ability and capacity to safely manage the virus. A permit will also set the specific conditions that must be complied with when importing the virus, including safe and secure transportation in accordance with recognised international standards.
- An import permit will only be granted if ACDP is able to satisfy the delegate that they can meet all import requirements and conditions that may be applied.
- The department will conduct ongoing assurance and verification activities with ACDP to ensure that they continue to adhere to all risk management requirements in accordance with and through the use of approved arrangement criteria, other agreements and the import conditions.

How the risks will be managed

The department will work with ACDP to perform a specific risk assessment of the processes and facilities at ACDP to determine if the risk of the importation of live LSD virus can be managed appropriately, and if so, to support the issuance of an import permit under the Biosecurity Act 2015.

An independent assurance review will also be conducted by the Inspector General of Biosecurity before the issuance of an import permit.

Only the secure facilities within ACDP with the absolute highest biosecurity controls will ever be permitted to conduct research on live LSD virus. These facilities feature many layers of containment and strict controls to prevent the release of any pathogens.

In addition to the ongoing risk management required by the department the use of LSD virus at ACDP will be regulated through the following mechanisms.

- The Office of the Gene Technology Regulator independently certifies facilities on appropriate physical containment, procedures, and practices, including within the ACDP secure area, and conducts risk assessments where genetically modified organisms are involved.
- The Department of Health conducts risk assessments on security sensitive biological agents such as LSD virus.
- The National Association of Testing Authorities undertakes regular assurance activities for laboratories.
- There is ongoing oversight of ACDP by the ACDP Security Assessment Group.



Government of South Australia
Department of Primary Industries
and Regions

Minute to
Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Minister for Forest Industries

MINISTER'S
OFFICE

18 JUL 2022

RECEIVED

Ref: eA197578

For	Noting and Signature
Critical Date	18 July 2022
Subject	Request to Department - Senator the Hon Murray Watt - Agriculture Ministers Meeting and Lumpy Skin Disease

Synopsis

Senator the Hon Murray Watt, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry wrote to you regarding the progress on the importation of Lumpy Skin Disease virus to the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) and the opportunity to work collaboratively on immediate and future biosecurity and industry challenges to achieve the best possible outcomes for our rural and regional communities.

Recommendations

That you:

1. Approve and sign the draft letter to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

APPROVED / NOT APPROVED



 Hon Clare Scriven MLC
**Minister for Primary Industries
and Regional Development**
Minister for Forest Industries
 318 / 2022

Ministerial Comments -

Background

- This background information is provided for the Minister in preparation for the AGMIN meeting where biosecurity issues are likely to be discussed.
- Parliamentary Briefing Note (PBN) Lumpy Skin Disease (LSD) (A5412294) contains background information on LSD and preparedness activities. PBN Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) contains background information on FMD and preparedness activities.
- The Hon Murray Watt MP, Australian Government Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, has written to you regarding the heightened risk of LSD reaching Australia and the lack of access to a suitable vaccine. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) is currently assessing the risk posed by importation of the live virus required to develop and test new vaccines.
- Provided biosecurity risks can be mitigated to an acceptable level of protection the importation of live virus is supported by PIRSA, other state and territory governments and industry. PIRSA have been supportive of live LSD virus being held at the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) when considered at Animal Health Committee (AHC), National Biosecurity Committee (NBC) and Agriculture Senior Officials Committee (AGSOC).
- The use of vaccine and laboratory testing capability and capacity in a response for critical tools for containing LSD to areas and attempting eradication. While import of vaccine will be beneficial for development of vaccine and laboratory testing capabilities activities to progress vaccine and laboratory preparedness should not be delayed until the virus is available.
- There are live vaccines available that are currently being used to protect livestock from LSD overseas. DAFF is currently progressing the ability to bring this vaccine in under an emergency permit for use in a response. Live vaccines cannot be used in Australia until a disease outbreak is declared as we will lose our disease freedom status and international market access as the vaccine contains a weakened live virus.
- DAFF is also considering the possibility of producing vaccines in Australia. This work is focused on inactivated (dead virus) or mRNA (uses a blueprint of part of the virus) vaccines.
- The roll out of LSD PCR testing capability to state laboratories is also to be progressed urgently so that the process is set up and ready to go, as has been done with FMD vaccine. Further proficiency testing can be progressed by ACDP once they have access to live virus.
- The high-level cross-industry taskforce (CIT) that was set up to co-ordinate industry's response to the detection of LSD in Indonesia is now incorporating FMD as well resulting in the inclusion of the pork, sheep, and wool industries. This group meet every 2 weeks with the most recent meeting on the 8 July 2022 and is represented by government with the inclusion of DAFF. There are 5 working groups under this CIT
 - Overseas in country support
 - Trade and protocols
 - Domestic containment strategy
 - LSD diagnostic capability and vaccine development
 - Communication strategy

PIRSA (and other states and territories) are represented by their CVO or delegate on the domestic containment strategy WG. activities with workshops

- The DAFF set up a taskforce in response to the detection of LSD in Indonesia that is lead by Dr Chris Parker. This taskforce has developed a draft LSD action plan and is currently undertaking a series of workshops to finalise the plan. PIRSA is represented by the Chief Veterinary Officer and Executive Director of Biosecurity at these workshops. Workshops held or planned include
 - Surveillance, preparedness and response- In person -21 June 2022
 - Diagnostics and vaccine- virtual- 28 June 2022
 - International engagement and trade protocols- In person -19 July 2022
 - Future focused (resilience and recovery) - virtual- TBC
- The DAFF LSD taskforce has now transitioned to an emergency animal disease preparedness (EADP) taskforce to incorporate activity relating to FMD. Actions and issues are transferred between the CIT and EADP taskforce when required.
- The AUSVETPLAN disease strategies for FMD and LSD have been reviewed and Animal Health Australia are hosting a series of meetings from 18 to 22 June in Canberra to consider issues and agree on solutions. The Chief Veterinary Officer will represent PIRSA at these meetings. These strategies are high level policy guidance documents and will require significant work at the state and national level in exercising scenarios and operationalising aspects to achieve preparedness for these diseases. A priority activity once these plans are finalised.
- PIRSA is working with Livestock SA, South Australian Dairyfarmers Association and PorkSA to conduct a desktop EAD workshop (planned for 4 August 2022) with a small number (less than 20) of South Australia industry leaders to develop an SA industry preparedness action plan. The workshop will be based on considering 4 scenarios of how FMD or LSD could be detected and focus on the immediate response activities (first 2-3 days of the response guided by the disease strategy) and industry impacts that are likely to occur. The resulting action plan will detail activities that industry can undertake now to improve response outcomes.
- PIRSA will be undertaking a similar exercise at the SA Rural Australian Veterinary Association conference in Robe on the 14 August 2022. This conference is attended by private practitioners and University of Adelaide representative

Discussion

- PIRSA has less resources than the commonwealth and larger states and territories. This impacts our ability to participate in preparedness activities to the same level and will affect our ability to effectively mount a response.
- Adding to this issue of a smaller resource is also the added difficulty of securing a workforce at the present moment. Similar to other states and territories recently vacated government roles are not able to be filled with suitable candidates.
- The DAFF often provide funding to support activities such as funding the laboratory testing for surveillance activities however participation in such surveillance is limited by not have the PIRSA staff resource to organise, collect and report the results which can be logistically time consuming.
- Any discussion at AGMIN regarding EAD preparedness activities should give due consideration to the resourcing issues currently being experienced.

Stakeholder / regional impacts, consultation and engagement

- Nil (relating to letter or AGMIN meeting)

Management of key risks

- Nil (relating to the letter or AGMIN meeting)

Legislative and/or financial implications

- Nil (relating to the letter or AGMIN meeting)

Attachments

A. Document title



for

CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Department of Primary Industries and Regions

15/7/2022

CONTACT	Nathan Rhodes
POSITION	Executive Director
DIVISION	Biosecurity
MOBILE and LANDLINE	0412 376 450
Cleared by	Mary Carr

Smart, Sharon (PIRSA)

From: PIRSA:Minister Scriven
Sent: Thursday, 4 August 2022 3:23 PM
To: minister.watt@agriculture.gov.au
Subject: Correspondence from Hon Clare Scriven MLC (South Australia) - Lumpy Skin Disease virus
Attachments: eA197578 - Letter from Minister Scriven 3-8-22.pdf

OFFICIAL

eA197578

Dear Minister

Please find attached correspondence from the Hon Clare Scriven MLC for your consideration.

Kind regards,
Sharon

Office of the Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Office of the Minister for Forest Industries

Level 10, 1 King William Street, Adelaide | GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001

P: +61 8 8226 2931 | E: minister.scriven@sa.gov.au

Government of
South Australia

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eA197578



Government
of South Australia

The Hon Clare Scriven MLC

Senator the Hon Murray Watt
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Minister for Emergency Management
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Email: dlo.watt@awe.gov.au

Dear Minister *Murray,*

Thank you for your letter of 4 July providing information regarding the progress of activities for the importation of Lumpy Skin Disease (LSD) virus to the high security laboratory facilities at the CSIRO's Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness. It is pleasing to see this is in the final stages and hopefully available to further prepare our response to LSD.

I appreciated the discussion regarding LSD at the recent Agricultural Ministers Meeting held on 20 July. With increasing biosecurity threats in the region, it is vitally important that we work together to ensure adequate resources are directed towards our preparedness activities.

The Department of Primary Industries and Regions SA (PIRSA) has been keeping me informed of the progress being made by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) Emergency Animal Disease preparedness taskforce and the Lumpy Skin Disease Action plan.

Should DAFF require any further assistance from PIRSA please feel free to contact Mr Nathan Rhodes who is the Executive Director of Biosecurity on email nathan.rhodes@sa.gov.au or phone on 0412 376 450.

Once again, thank you for writing to me on this very important matter and I look forward to working with you to continue supporting South Australian farmers and regional communities.

Yours sincerely

Clare Scriven

Hon Clare Scriven MLC
MINISTER FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRIES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MINISTER FOR FOREST INDUSTRIES

3 / 8 / 2022

Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Minister for Forest Industries

GPO Box 1671 Adelaide SA 5001
Telephone 08 8226 2931 | Email minister.scriven@sa.gov.au





Minute to
Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development
Minister for Forest Industries

eA197414

Ref: A5441243

For	Noting
Critical Date	Routine
Subject	Update on Lumpy Skin Disease and Foot and Mouth Disease

Synopsis

This briefing provides information on activities underway, at the national and state level, in response to outbreaks of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) and Lumpy Skin Disease (LSD) in Indonesia.

In May 2022, the Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment (DAWE) wrote to the Chief Executive of PIRSA reiterating the serious threat to Australia's cattle industry and the need for immediate, concerted and collaborative preparedness action

Recommendations

That you:

- Note the brief.

NOTED

.....
 Hon Clare Scriven MLC
**Minister for Primary Industries
 and Regional Development**
Minister for Forest Industries

/ / 2022

Ministerial Comments

Background

- LSD and FMD are highly infectious viral diseases. They effect cattle and water buffalo (LSD) and cloven hoofed animals, including cattle, sheep, goats and pigs (FMD). Further disease information can be found in the attached fact sheets (Attachment A and B).
- Both LSD and FMD are considered EADs due to their ability to rapidly spread and due to their devastating impact on production and trade. The economic and social impacts of these diseases cannot be overstated.
- In May 2022 an outbreak of FMD was reported in Indonesia to the World Organisation of Animal Health (OIE).
- As Australia doesn't import live animals from LSD or FMD affected countries, entry pathways include illegal product import or via passengers (e.g. on shoes or clothing). LSD may also enter via insect vectors, either on prevailing winds from affected countries or as hitchhikers on planes, boats or cargo.
- In March 2021, the Commonwealth government in collaboration with the Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis (CEBRA) undertook an expert judgement exercise to consider the risk of an EAD outbreak in Australia in the next five years. A 42% probability of an outbreak was predicted. This was repeated for LSD after the Indonesian outbreak and their prediction of an outbreak increased from 8% to 28%.
- It is abundantly clear that these Emergency Animal Diseases (EADs) present a serious threat to Australia's livestock industries and immediate, concerted and collaborative preparedness action is required by government and industry.

Discussion

- Historically preparedness activities for FMD, based on lessons learned from outbreaks in the United Kingdom, Japan and Korea, have included maintaining a FMD vaccine bank overseas, imposing a ban on swill feeding, and regular programs to raise awareness of clinical signs and testing requirements for the disease. LSD has not had the same level of preparedness activities.
- The Commonwealth government has committed \$61.6 million in additional funding over four years to boost biosecurity in northern Australia, given ongoing disease spread of FMD, LSD and African Swine Fever (ASF) in our northern neighbouring countries. This will be utilised to increase diagnostic testing capacity, to support surveillance programs, and to identify vaccines for LSD that are suitable for use in Australia.
- A Commonwealth taskforce, to co-ordinate and prioritise Australia's preparedness activities pre-border, at the border and post border. The taskforce has developed a draft National LSD Action Plan (Attachment C) that is currently out for consultation. This plan will be finalised through a series of targeted working groups drawn from industry and the states and territories.
- The LSD Action Plan has 8 key objectives: international engagement, border biosecurity and trade, diagnostic capability, surveillance, preparedness and response, awareness and communication, research and innovation, resilience and recovery. PIRSA will be engaged in all of these key objectives.
- Additionally the Red Meat Advisory Council (RMAC) has activated its crisis response process and formed an LSD industry taskforce. The taskforce has formed five

committees: Overseas in-country support, Trade and protocols, LSD diagnostics capability & vaccine development and Domestic containment strategy. The South Australian Chief Veterinary Officer and the Livestock SA CEO are both members of the Domestic Containment strategy committee.

Stakeholder / regional impacts, consultation and engagement

- The immediate impacts of an exotic disease outbreak in Australia include:
 - International market loss, including for live cattle and genetic materials, dairy products, animal by-products (such as hides and skins), and some meat products.
 - Welfare and health implications in affected animals
 - Production losses including deaths, decreased milk production, damaged skins, and reproductive effects.
 - Significant costs to government and industry to control or eradicate, including the potential development and use of vaccines.
- Livestock SA, South Australian Dairyfarmers Association (SADA) and Pork SA are scheduled to meet with PIRSA to start forming an action plan to progress state level preparedness. This will provide inputs into both the Commonwealth and industry led taskforces.

Management of key risks

- Significant resources are required to adequately prepare for emergency responses. PIRSA is developing a proposal to address immediate preparedness activities.
- Ensuring PIRSA maintains and develops sufficient veterinary expertise is essential to focus on modelling and surveillance activities, destruction, decontamination and disposal preparedness, risk assessment, movement controls and permit preparedness, and training and protocol development.
- PIRSA has initiated an awareness program with website updates, extension of social media messaging and communication to the private veterinary network and industry. Industry have been provided on-line training material to start building their capacity and capability in response activities.

Legislative and/or financial implications

- Provisions for the control and eradication of EADs are under the *Livestock Act 1997* with the Chief Inspector of Stock provided the delegations to manage the response.
- It is expected that an EAD outbreak will trigger both national and state emergency declarations similar to that experienced in COVID-19.
- Any outbreak of these diseases will be managed under the EAD Response Agreement (EADRA)¹. This national agreements was signed in 2002 by Australia's governments (including South Australia) and industry groups to collectively reduce the risk of disease incursions and manage an outbreak response. Signatories commit to contribute to funding eligible costs of responding to an EAD.
- Estimated costs of a FMD outbreak range from \$6-\$50 billion² (2003 estimate). An outbreak of LSD would have similar economic impacts. Most of these costs are borne by the livestock industry in lost revenue due to the collapse of Australia's export


¹ [Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement - Animal Health Australia](#)

² [Consequences of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak - DAWE](#)

markets. Updated predictions by ABARES using 2022 figures estimate this could now be \$80-\$100 billion.

Attachments

- Attachment A - LSD factsheet
- Attachment B – FMD factsheet
- Attachment C - Draft National LSD plan



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CHIEF EXECUTIVE
Department of Primary Industries and Regions

03 /06 /2022

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


Australian Government

Department of Agriculture,
Water and the Environment

Lumpy skin disease

March 2022




Lumpy skin disease (LSD) is a devastating viral disease of cattle and water buffalo. The disease is **not present in Australia** but has rapidly spread through south Asia, with cases now confirmed in Indonesia.

About the disease

LSD is a highly infectious disease of cattle and water buffalo that does not affect other livestock or humans. It is caused by a virus like sheep pox and goat pox and is mostly spread by biting insects such as flies and mosquitoes, and possibly ticks. The disease can also be spread by fomites through such things as contaminated equipment and in some cases directly from animal to animal.

Infection with lumpy skin disease typically causes an acute disease with fever, depression, and characteristic skin nodules. There may also be a marked reduction in milk yield as well as abortion in pregnant animals.



Signs of Lumpy skin disease in animals

Cattle overseas infected with Lumpy skin disease

- Firm, raised nodules of up to 50mm in diameter develop on the skin around the head, neck, genitals and limbs. Nodules can develop on any part of the body.
- Scabs develop in the centre of the nodules after which the scabs fall off, leaving large holes that may become infected.
- Swelling of the limbs, brisket and genitals may occur.
- Watering eyes.
- Increased nasal and salivary secretions.
- Some animals with the disease may be asymptomatic (have the disease but not show signs).

LSD has shown the ability to establish and spread in a wide range of environmental and production systems around the world.

Impacts

If Australia was no longer recognised as being free from lumpy skin disease this would have significant consequences for our beef, water buffalo, and dairy cattle industries, along with substantial trade impacts.

Where the disease is found

LSD is endemic in most of Africa, parts of the Middle East and Turkey. Since 2019, the disease has spread through China and Southeast Asia; and in 2021, the disease was confirmed in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia. Indonesia reported confirmed cases in March 2022.

Vaccination

There is currently no LSD vaccine approved for use in Australia.

In southern Europe vaccination has been used to effectively control outbreaks, however in other areas vaccination was not successful.

Keeping it out of Australia

Eradication of LSD is difficult and early detection is essential for successful control and the possibility of eradication.

Cattle producers, and particularly communities across Australia's north need to be particularly vigilant for the disease and be able to identify it in infected animals.

LSD is a nationally notifiable disease which means it must be reported to a veterinarian or the Emergency Animal Disease Watch Hotline on **1800 675 888**. This number will connect you with your state or territory's department of primary industries or agriculture.

Cattle producers and others working in the industry are reminded to practice good biosecurity on their property and when working with animals. You can find out more at farmbiosecurity.com.au

Government action

The Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment undertakes a range of activities to manage biosecurity risks to Australia. The Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy works with state and territory governments on targeted surveillance activities and delivers public awareness campaigns to support the early detection of exotic animal diseases such as lumpy skin disease.


The department's strict livestock importing protocols are designed to minimise the risk of exotic disease incursions, and returning livestock vessels are also managed by department's biosecurity officers.

Border requirements are in place for incoming air and sea passengers, imported cargo and mail items to ensure the biosecurity risks are managed at the border.


Import conditions are reviewed when the level of risk changes.

Australia has well-developed disease response arrangements in place that involve all levels of government and the livestock industries. Those procedures are regularly tested, updated and improved.

For more information go to awe.gov.au/lumpyskin



Cattle overseas infected with Lumpy skin disease.



Close up of nodules caused by Lumpy skin disease. Photo courtesy of Noah's Arkive PIADC